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Quine on Identity
Jean-Yves Béziau
Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology , 2003,
Abstract: In a first section, we discuss Quine’s claim according to which identity is a logical notion. We point out that Quine mixes up various types of identities: trivial (or diagonal) identity, Leibniz identity, etc.; and this leads him to commit several mistakes. In a second section, we review Quine’s criticisms to various philosophers (Wittgenstein, Whitehead, Leibniz, etc.), who ac-cording to him made confusion between names and objects in defining identity. We show that in fact only Korzybski can be accused of such confusion. In a third section, we analyze the relation between identity and entity. We notice that for Quine a river is the result of the identification of river stages, but that he admits it as an entity by opposition to squareness, which according to him is a result of an identification process of higher abtraction.
Quine and Ontology
Oswaldo Chateaubriand
Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology , 2003,
Abstract: Ontology played a very large role in Quine’s philosophy and was one of his major preoccupations from the early 30’s to the end of his life. His work on ontology provided a basic framework for most of the discussions of ontology in analytic philosophy in the second half of the Twentieth Century. There are three main themes (and several sub-themes) that Quine developed in his work. The first is ontological commitment: What are the existential commitments of a theory? The second is ontological reduction: How can an ontology be reduced to (or substituted by) another? And what is the most economical ontology that can be obtained for certain given purposes? The third is criteria of identity: When are entities of some kind (sets, properties, material objects, propositions, meanings, etc.) the same or different? In this paper I discuss Quine’s development of these three themes and some of the problems that were aised in connection with his work.
Quine on analycity and logical truths
Zori? Aleksandra
Theoria, Beograd , 2012, DOI: 10.2298/theo1204039z
Abstract: The aim of this work is to offer a recontruction of Quine’s arguments directed against the notion of analycity and conventionalism about the logical truth. We start by investigating some of the ideas which Carnap, the main target of Quine’s attacks, held in this respect. This will enable us to make a firmer footing on the background of Quine’s papers, both early ones offering the critique of Carnap’s standpoint as well as later ones that, allegedly, deal with problems not so tightly related to the ones mentioned before. This change of focus is only apparent, as we shall show that there is a significant systematic component of Quine’s thought which, if disregarded, could lead us astray regarding some of the most important aspects of Quine’s position. We shall see that, regarding the rejection of the notion of analycity, Quine’s holism as well as his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation plays a prominent role. Forbearing the idea of propositions as the basic units of meaning, as well as the idea of a sensible talk about meaning independent of the complete body of a theory, coupled with Quine’s behaviorism, sheds new light on some of the problems Quine was facing during the whole course of his career.
Quine's Ideological Debacle
Lieven Decock
Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology , 2004,
Abstract: In two papers in the mid-seventies, Quine has discussed an ontological deba-cle, the reduction of ontology to an ontology of pure sets only. This debacle, which weakened Quine’s interest in ontology, is the natural outcome of on-tological relativity, or, more precisely, the proxy-function argument. It is ex-plained how Quine unavoidably came to this conclusion. Moreover, it is ar-gued that the result is even more damaging for Quine’s philosophy than has hitherto been assumed. It is shown that in addition to an ontological debacle, there is an ideological debacle, reducing the ideology (lexicon) of science to the ideology of set theory. The ideological debacle results from applying ex-tensional substitution of predicates within a scientific theory that is reinter-preted by means of proxy-functions to a theory with a set-theoretic ontology. Though Quine has recognized the possibility of an ideological debacle, his rebuttal is unconvincing. As a result, his tenet of extensionalism is under heavy pressure.
Distinguishing WV Quine and Donald Davidson
James Pearson
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy , 2011, DOI: 10.4148/jhap.v1i1.1293
Abstract: Given W.V. Quine’s and Donald Davidson’s extensive agreement about much of the philosophy of language and mind, and the obvious methodological parallels between Quine’s radical translation and Davidson’s radical interpretation, many—including Quine and Davidson—are puzzled by their occasional disagreements. I argue for the importance of attending to these disagreements, not just because doing so deepens our understanding of these influential thinkers, but because they are in fact the shadows thrown from two distinct conceptions of philosophical inquiry: Quine’s “naturalism” and what I call Davidson’s “humanism.” The clash between Quine and Davidson thus provides valuable insight into the history of analytic naturalism and its malcontents.
Quine’s Indeterminacy of Translation Thesis  [cached]
Xiang Xu
Journal of Language Teaching and Research , 2010, DOI: 10.4304/jltr.1.3.274-277
Abstract: This paper aims to analyze Quine’s major theories of Indeterminacy of Meaning and Inscrutability of Reference by their definition and appearance, then comments them in daily communication and practical translation activities.
Modified Quine-McCluskey Method  [PDF]
Vitthal Jadhav,Amar Buchade
Computer Science , 2012,
Abstract: The digital gates are basic electronic component of any digital circuit. Digital circuit should be simplified in order to reduce its cost by reducing number of digital gates required to implement it. To achieve this, we use Boolean expression that helps in obtaining minimum number of terms and does not contain any redundant pair. Karnaugh map(K-map) and Quine-McCluskey(QM) methods are well known methods to simplify Boolean expression. K-map method becomes complex beyond five variable Boolean expression. Quine-McCluskey method is computer based technique for minimization of Boolean function and it is faster than K-map method. This paper proposes E-sum based optimization to Quine-McCluskey Method to increase its performance by reducing number of comparisons between mintermlist in determination of prime implicants. Modified Quine-McCluskey method(MQM) can be implemented to any number of variable.
A critica behaviorista de W. O. Quine
Arruda, Antonio Trajano Menezes;
Trans/Form/A??o , 1980, DOI: 10.1590/S0101-31731980000100007
Abstract: the object of this paper is quine's behavioristic critique of semantics and epistemology. quine claims to have produced with this critique important contributions to the clarification of a number a notions, among them the notion of observation, or of observation sentence, a topic which is discussed here in detail. it is also discussed the precise role of the so-called duhem-quine thesis in quine's rejection of the doctrine of propositions.
Quine and Wittgenstein: The End of Analytic Philosophy?
Darlei Dall'Agnol
Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology , 2003,
Abstract: This paper deals with the question whether science and philosophy are continuous, as Quine thought, or whether they are completely separated, as Wittgenstein held. Reconstructing the reasons why the latter kept a sharp distinction between science and philosophy, it examines the attempts of the former to resolve philosophical problems in scientific terms. It maintains that Quine’s scientism is misconceived and presents further reasons for making a distinction (if not a separation) between science and philosophy.
Quine y el pragmatismo clásico
Discusiones Filosóficas , 2010,
Abstract: quine has often been associated with the pragmatists or at the very least his work has been found to be consonant with pragmatism. in this essay i examine the relation between quine's work and that of the classical pragmatists: peirce, james, and dewey. my study of quine's writings will reveal several similarities with james' doctrine of the limits of experience, and at the same time it will bring to light significant differences with dewey's naturalism and peirce's pragmatism. on balance, although there are some elements in common between the classical pragmatists and quine, it is not possible to assert that there ever was any interest on quine's part to adopt the theses of the pragmatists in order to develop them in novel directions.
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