Abstract:
Physicalism, if it is to be a significant thesis, should differentiate itself from key metaphysical contenders which endorse the existence of platonic entities, emergent properties, Cartesian souls, angels, and God. Physicalism can never be true in worlds where things of these kinds exist. David Papineau, David Spurrett, and Barbara Montero have recently developed and defended two influential conceptions of physicalism. One is derived from a conception of the physical as the non-mentally-and-non-biologically identifiable. The other is derived from a conception of the physical as the non-sui-generis-mental. The paper looks at the resources available to those conceptions, but argues that each is insufficient to yield a conception of physicalism that differentiates it from key anti-physicalist positions. According to these conceptions, if we lived in a world full of things that clearly cannot be physical, we would still live in a physical world. Thus, such conceptions of physicalism are of little theoretical interest.

Abstract:
The content of this paper contains four parts. (1) First, physicalism gives the enlightenments to behaviorism: mind-body identity, objectivity like physics and completeness of reduction. (2) Secondly, there are difficulties which behaviorist could not overcome—both the reduction of the theory and the terms are unreliable, and the strict distinction between introspective method and inter-subjective method is also untenable. (3) Thirdly, It has inevitable incompleteness in one theory no matter what it claims due to the limitations of human cognition. (4) Finally, the author concludes that we should treat various theories in a "both this and that" but "either this or that" way. Therefore, we should admit the contribution of behaviorism and its model philosophy—physicalism, although they has failed in seeking for completeness.

Abstract:
In the context of theories of the connection between mind and brain, physicalism is the demand that all is basically purely physical. But the concept of "physical" embodied in this demand is characterized essentially by the properties of the physical that hold in classical physical theories. Certain of these properties contradict the character of the physical in quantum mechanics, which provides a better, more comprehensive, and more fundamental account of phenomena. It is argued that the difficulties that have plaged physicalists for half a century, and that continue to do so, dissolve when the classical idea of the physical is replaced by its quantum successor. The argument is concretized in a way that makes it accessible to non-physicists by exploiting the recent evidence connecting our conscious experiences to macroscopic measurable synchronous oscillations occurring in well-separated parts of the brain. A specific new model of the mind-brain connection that is fundamentally quantum mechanical but that ties conscious experiences to these macroscopic synchronous oscillations is used to illustrate the essential disparities between the classical and quantum notions of the physical, and in particular to demonstrate the failure in the quantum world of the principle of the causal closure of the physical, a failure that goes beyond what is entailed by the randomness in the outcomes of observations, and that accommodates the efficacy in the brain of conscious intent.

Abstract:
In recent literature, it has become clear that quantum physics does not refute Humeanism. This point has so far been made with respect to Bohms quantum theory. Against this background, this paper seeks to achieve the following four results: to generalize the option of quantum Humeanism from Bohmian mechanics to primitive ontology theories in general, to show that this option applies also to classical mechanics, to establish that it requires a commitment to matter as primitive stuff, but no commitment to natural properties (physicalism without properties, to point out that by removing the commitment to properties, the stock metaphysical objections against Humeanism from quidditism and humility no longer apply. In that way, quantum physics strengthens Humeanism instead of refuting it.

Abstract:
The 1991 Bethesda System for cervical/vaginal cytology reporting has defined adequacy criteria, including unsatisfactory designation. Most laboratories in USA and a few laboratories in Iran have implemented these criteria, but only few studies about clinical implications have been performed. All unsatisfactory Papanicolaou (Pap) smears taken between August 2000 and March 2002 were retrieved from the file of cytologic reports of Mirza Koochak Khan Hospital's Department of Pathology. Of 4,598 total Pap smears 204 (4.4%) were unsatisfactory (corresponding atypical rate of 2.5% and a SIL/carcinoma rate of 0.97%). About 20.2% of unsatisfactory Pap smears were from patients with a history of epithelial abnormalities. The majority (71 of 204 specimens; 35%) of follow-up Pap smears or biopsies occurred within 6 months,12% within 6-12 months,1% within 12-18 months and 1% after 18 months. Approximately 59% had no follow-up. The first repeat Pap smear or histologic specimen in 83 patients with follow-up was negative in 71 (85%), unsatisfactory in 2(2.4%), epithelial cell abnormality in 11 (13.2%) and atypical squamous cells of undetermined significance in 4(4.8%). Nonmalignant conditions contributing to the unsatisfactory smears on histologic specimens (23%) included cervicitis, endocervical polyp and endometritis. Majority of patients with unsatisfactory Pap smears were followed up within 6 months. A significant number(13.2%) of those with follow-up had eventual diagnosis of epithelial cell abnormality. Benign pathologic conditions also contributed to unsatisfactory smears. These patients were more likely to have a history of abnormalities. Unsatisfactory specimens are associated with benign as well as preneoplastic/neoplastic conditions. Clinical correlation should be the first step in delineating the cause of the unsatisfactory diagnosis.

Abstract:
Jaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challenge to both emergentism and nom-reductive physicalism by providing arguments that these positions are committed to an untenable combination of both ‘upward’ and ‘dounward’ determination. In section 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realization relation underlies such skeptical arguments However, in section 2, I suggest that such conclusions involve a confusion between the implications of physicalism and those of a related thesis the ‘Completeness of Physics' (Co?) I show that the truth of CoP poses a very serious obstacle to realized properties being efficacious in a physicalist universe and suggest that abandoning CoP offers hope for defending non-reductive physicalism. I then formulate a schema for a physicalist metaphysics, in section 3, which rejects CoP. This scenario is one where microphysical properties have a few conditional powers that they contribute to individuals when they realize certain properties In such a situation, I argue, though physicalism holds true there is still plausibly both ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ determination, where the latter is crucially an underappreciated form of determination I temn 'non- causal'. Ultimately, I conclude that this metaphysical schema offers a coherent account of Strongly emergent properties that preserves the truth of NRP albeit, in a form that is purged of any commitment to CoP. Finally, in section: 4, I carefully explore which of Kim's assumptions and arguments this metaphysics undermines.

Abstract:
In the article the author is following the development of Alfred Rosenberg’s social and political theory. Special attention is given to the anti-Christian attitude of the so-called "chief ideologist of Third Reich". Although one among the creators of the apocalyptic anti-Semitist ideology (about "final battle" with the Jews - perceived as the powers of Evil incarnated) he opposed Nazi "Eastern politics" during the World War II. Instead of atrocities against the eastern peoples (Ukrainians, Russians etc) he was prepared to give them certain autonomy and to treat them as some kind of racially inferior allies. For him, only Jews deserved extermination ("once for all") and it was this ultimate goal he expected to shape not only German foreign policy but also war itself.

Abstract:
We give a proof of I. G. Rosenberg's characterization of maximal clones. The theorem lists six types of relations on a finite set such that a clone over this set is maximal if and only if it contains just the functions preserving one of the relations of the list. In Universal Algebra, this translates immediately into a characterization of the finite preprimal algebras: A finite algebra is preprimal if and only if its term operations are exactly the functions preserving a relation of one of the six types listed in the theorem. The difficult part of the proof is to show that all maximal clones or preprimal algebras respectively are of that form. This follows from, and, as we also demonstrate, is indeed equivalent to, a characterization of primal algebras: We show that the primal algebras are exactly those whose term operations do not preserve any of the relations on the list.

Abstract:
There exists a holomorphic quadratic differential defined on any $H-$surface immersed in the homogeneous space $\mathbb{E}(\kappa , \tau)$ given by U. Abresch and H. Rosenberg, called the Abresch-Rosenberg differential. However, there were no Codazzi pairs on such $H-$surfaces associated to the Abresch-Rosenberg differential when $\tau \neq 0$. The goal of this paper is to find a geometric Codazzi pair defined on any $H-$surface in $\mathbb{E}(\kappa , \tau)$, when $\tau \neq 0$, whose $(2,0)-$part is the Abresch-Rosenberg differential. In particular, this allows us to compute a Simon's Type Formula for $H-$surfaces in $\mathbb{E}(\kappa , \tau)$. As applications, first, we study the behavior of complete $H-$surfaces $\Sigma$ with finite Abresch-Rosenberg total curvature immersed in $\mathbb{E}(\kappa , \tau)$. Second, we estimate the first eigenvalue of any Schr\"{o}dinger Operator $L= \Delta + V$, $V$ continuous, defined on such surfaces. Finally, together with the Omori-Yau's Maximum Principle, we classify complete $H-$surfaces in $\mathbb{E}(\kappa , \tau)$, $\tau \neq 0$, satisfying a lower bound on $H$ depending on $\kappa$ and $\tau$.

Abstract:
The Rosenberg problem is a typical but not a too complex problem of nonholonomic mechanical systems. By using the theory of Noether symmetries of nonholonomic systems, the conserved quantities of the problem is successively deduced,and the final result is obtained.