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Duas concep es do anti-psicologismo  [PDF]
Lucas Ribeiro Vollet
PERI , 2012,
Abstract: Este artigo pretende discutir a existência de duas formas de antipsicologismo, uma representada por Kant e a outra por Frege. O objetivo da discuss o é apresentar duas maneiras diferentes de interpretar o perigo do psicologismo para a lógica, e mostrar como cada interpreta o funda pressuposi es fundamentais que levam a diferentes tradi es filosóficas. O artigo argumentará que o antipsicologismo fregeano é a base da amplia o da no o de analítico e da crítica da no o de sintético a priori na aritmética. Enquanto que o antipsicologismo kantiano é a base da no o de forma geral das representa es, que funda a tradi o fenomenológica da filosofia.
Los deícticos: Un problema para la semántica de Gottlob Frege
Bejarano Chaves,ángela Rocío;
Discusiones Filosóficas , 2010,
Abstract: the thesis of this article is that we have enough reasons to consider indexicals as a problem for gottlob frege's semantic. we will divide the text into two parts: in the first one, we will expose the semantic program of the german logician by means of three structuring theses. in the second one, we will introduce the question of the indexicals, exploring how they represent a problem for the above mentioned program.
A crítica de Frege ao idealismo em Der Gedanke  [PDF]
Porta, Mario Ariel González
Veritas , 2009,
Abstract: Para Frege, o erro de base do psicologismo é a sua concep o de sujeito, que se concentra no princípio de que meus únicos objetos s o conteúdos imanentes da consciência. Entretanto, essa tese n o é meramente falsa, mas também refutável. A refuta o da mesma aparece, n o obstante, tardiamente em Der Gedanke. é esse o sentido último da crítica do idealismo oferecida neste texto. Ela é um passo necessário e imprescindível para assegurar a possibilidade de que captemos pensamentos, possibilidade com a qual se ocupa boa parte do artigo de 1918. According to Frege, the basic mistake of psychologism is its conception of the subject, which is centered in the principle that only immanent contents of consciousness can be my objects. Now, this thesis is not only false, but also refutable. The refutation itself appears later in Der Gedanke. This is the last sense of the critique of idealism brought about in that text. It is a necessary and unavoidable step to assure the possibility that we grasp thoughts, possibility that Frege deals with in great part of his 1918 article.
Frege on Truths, Truth and the True
Wolfgang Künne
Studia Philosophica Estonica , 2008,
Abstract: The founder of modern logic and grandfather of analytic philosophy was 70 years old when he published his paper 'Der Gedanke' (The Thought ) in 1918. This essay contains some of Gottlob Frege's deepest and most provocative reflections on the concept of truth, and it will play a prominent role in my lectures. The plan for my lectures is as follows. What is it that is (primarily) true or false? 'Thoughts', is Frege's answer. In §1, I shall explain and defend this answer. In §2, I shall briefly consider his enthymematic argument for the conclusion that the word 'true' resists any attempt at defining it. In §3, I shall discuss his thesis that the thought that things are thus and so is identical with the thought that it is true that things are thus and so. The reasons we are offered for this thesis will be found wanting. In §4, I shall comment extensively on Frege's claim that, in a non-formal language like the one I am currently trying to speak, we can say whatever we want to say without ever using the word 'true' or any of its synonyms. I will reject the propositional-redundancy claim, endorse the assertive-redundancy claim and deny the connection Frege ascribes to them. In his classic 1892 paper 'über Sinn und Bedeutung' (On Sense and Signification) Frege argues that truth-values are objects. In §5, I shall scrutinize his argument. In §6, I will show that in Frege's ideography (Begriffsschrift) truth, far from being redundant, is omnipresent. The final §7 is again on truth-bearers, this time as a topic in the theory of intentionality and in metaphysics. In the course of discussing Frege's views on the objecthood, the objectivity of thoughts and the timelessness of truth(s), I will plead for a somewhat mitigated Platonism.
Russell And Frege On The Logic of Functions  [cached]
Bernard Linsky
The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication , 2009, DOI: 10.4148/biyclc.v4i0.133
Abstract: I compare Russell’s theory of mathematical functions, the “descriptive functions” from Principia Mathematica 30, with Frege’s well known account of functions as “unsaturated” entities. Russell analyses functional terms with propositional functions and the theory of de nite descriptions. This is the primary technical role of the theory of descriptions in P M . In Principles of Mathematics and some unpublished writings from before 1905, Russell offered explicit criticisms of Frege’s account of functions. Consequenly, the theory of descriptions in “On Denoting” can be seen as a crucial part of Russell’s larger logicist reduction of mathematics,aswellasanexcursionintothetheoryof reference.
A short introduction to Gottlob Frege's Begriffsschrift  [PDF]
Sven-Ake Wegner
Mathematics , 2014,
Abstract: In his 1879 paper on the Begriffsschrift, Gottlob Frege introduced a notation to formalize mathematical arguments. In this note we explain Frege's notation by using the nowadays common notions from elementary propositional logic. We compare Frege's notation with the modern one and discuss some of the methods he used in his paper.
Deíxis en Frege  [PDF]
Juan Carlos García V.
Onomázein : Revista de Lingüística, Filología y Traducción , 1997,
Abstract: En este trabajo se presenta, de modo crítico, el tratamiento que G. Frege da a oraciones asertóricas que contienen, como una de sus partes, una expresión deíctica. Esta clase de oraciones oponen resistencia al intento fregueano, pues, como se mostrará, tanto la noción de "sentido", rígidamente antisicologista, como el carácter puramente "extensional" del sistema semántico del pensador germano, se constituyen en obstáculos infranqueables para una explicación consistente del operar significativo de oraciones provistas de alguna expresión ejemplar-reflexiva. (This paper examines critically assertive sentences containing deictic expressions, as viewed by G. Frege. The author shows how, contrary to Fregean postulates concerning this type of sentences, the utterly antipsycological notion of "sense", as well as the merely "extensional" character of his semantic system, become unsurmountable hindrances to give a consistent account of the meaningful working of sentences containing some token-reflexive expression.)
Interface entre linguagem e educa o: o problema metodológico do ensino de ortografia
Marcos Paulo Santa Rosa Matos
Revista Letrando , 2013,
Abstract: Procurando apresentar alguns princípios para o ensino construtivista e reflexivo de ortografia, analisa-se a problemática teórica e metodológica da rela o entre língua, gramática, ortografia e didática. Parte-se de uma revis o da crítica linguística e construtivista ao ensino tradicional, discutindo os conceitos de língua padr o, varia o linguística, gramática normativa, ortografia e erros ortográficos, de um lado, e os procedimentos didáticos de memoriza o, cópia e repeti o mecanica de formas escritas, artificializa o da língua falada e suplanta o do estudo reflexivo e pragmático da linguagem pelos estudos metalinguísticos, de outro.Em seguida, debatem-se as diretrizes científicas e oficiais do ensino de ortografia do Português Brasileiro, apresentando e sintetizando as propostas didáticas de Morais (2009) – baseadas em princípios construtivistas e psicolinguísticos e voltadas para a exigência pedagógica, epistemológica e democrática da práxis crítico-reflexiva – para um ensino ortográfico tomado como instrumento para a constru o da cidadania enquanto elemento estruturante das subjetividades sociais.
Frege and numbers as self-subsistent objects
Discusiones Filosóficas , 2010,
Abstract: this paper argues that frege is not the metaphysical platonist about mathematics that he is standardly taken to be. it is shown that frege's project has two distinct stages: the identification of what is true of our ordinary notions, and then the provision of a systematic account that shares the identified features. neither of these stages involves much metaphysics. the paper criticizes in detail dummett's interpretation of §§55-61 of grundlagen. these sections fall under the heading 'every number is a self-subsistent object' and are described by dummett as containing the worst arguments put forward by frege. it is argued that essentially all of dummett's interpretive points are mistaken. finally, i show that frege's claims about the independence of mathematics from humans and their activities does not commit him to any particularly metaphysical position either.
Bounded arithmetic AID for Frege system  [PDF]
Toshiyasu Arai
Mathematics , 1998,
Abstract: In this paper we introduce a system AID (Alogtime Inductive Definitions) of bounded arithmetic. The main feature of AID is to allow a form of inductive definitions, which was extracted from Buss' propositional consistency proof of Frege systems F. We show that AID proves the soundness of F, and conversely any \Sigma^b_0-theorem in AID yields boolean sentences of which F has polysize proofs. Further we define \Sigma^b_1-faithful interpretations between AID + \Sigma b^_0 - CA and a quantified theory QALV of an equational system ALV in P. Clote. Hence ALV also proves the soundness of F.
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