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 Vuki？evi？ Milan R. Glasnik ？umarskog Fakulteta , 2009, DOI: 10.2298/gsf0999007v Abstract: Cooperation, in combination with specialization, is aimed at the better utilization of resources, shorter production cycle and cost reduction. This means that cooperation and specialization, in addition to technological aspect, also include the organization aspect. The problem in wood processing is the fact that the organization aspect is completely neglected. For this reason, specialization and cooperation cannot reach their goal. The aim of this paper is to point out the significance of the organization aspect. The selection of cooperants cannot be based on the prices and acquaintances, recommendations, etc. There are numerous criteria which can decide the selection of cooperants. The criteria adopted in this paper are the manufacturing price and the storage cost. Based on the multicriteria decision making, it is possible to define the alternative which enables simultaneously the lowest total price and the lowest total own storage costs.
 Valerio Capraro Computer Science , 2013, Abstract: Over the years, numerous experiments have been accumulated to show that cooperation is not casual and depends on the payoffs of the game. These findings suggest that humans have attitude to cooperation by nature and the same person may act more or less cooperatively depending on the particular payoffs. In other words, people do not act a priori as single agents, but they forecast how the game would be played if they formed coalitions and then they play according to their best forecast. In this paper we formalize this idea and we define a new solution concept for one-shot normal form games. We prove that this \emph{cooperative equilibrium} exists for all finite games and it explains a number of different experimental findings, such as (1) the rate of cooperation in the Prisoner's dilemma depends on the cost-benefit ratio; (2) the rate of cooperation in the Traveler's dilemma depends on the bonus/penalty; (3) the rate of cooperation in the Publig Goods game depends on the pro-capite marginal return and on the numbers of players; (4) the rate of cooperation in the Bertrand competition depends on the number of players; (5) players tend to be fair in the bargaining problem; (6) players tend to be fair in the Ultimatum game; (7) players tend to be altruist in the Dictator game; (8) offers in the Ultimatum game are larger than offers in the Dictator game.
 PLOS Computational Biology , 2014, DOI: doi/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003618 Abstract: Understanding the factors that promote, disrupt, or shape the nature of cooperation is one of the main tasks of evolutionary biology. Here, we focus on attitudes and beliefs supportive of in-group favoritism and strict adherence to moral consensus, collectively known as ideological rigidity, that have been linked with both ends of the political spectrum. The presence among the political right and the left is likely to make ideological rigidity a major determinant of the political discourse with an important social function. To better understand this function, we equip the indirect reciprocity framework – widely used to explain evaluation-mediated social cooperation – with multiple stylized value systems, each corresponding to the different degree of ideological rigidity. By running game theoretical simulations, we observe the competitive evolution of these systems, map conditions that lead to more ideologically rigid societies, and identify potentially disastrous outcomes. In particular, we uncover that barriers to cooperation aid ideological rigidity. The society may even polarize to the extent where social parasites overrun the population and cause the complete collapse of the social structure. These results have implications for lawmakers globally, warning against restrictive or protectionist policies.
 Computer Science , 2013, Abstract: This paper discusses our investigation into the evolution of cooperative players in an online business environment. We explain our design of an incentive based system with its foundation over binary reputation system whose proportion of reward or punishment is a function of transaction value and the players past history of cooperation. We compare the evolution of cooperation in our setting with non-incentive based environment and our findings show that the incentive based method is more suitable for the evolution of trustworthy players.
 Jakson Alves de Aquino Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems , 2011, Abstract: This paper presents an agent based model of the evolution of cooperation in a complex environment. Anthropoid agents reproduce sexually, and live in a world where food is irregularly distributed in space and seasonally produced. They can share food, form hunting and migrating groups, and are able to build alliances to dispute territory. The agents memorize their interactions with others and their actions are mainly guided by emotions, modelled as propensities to react in specific ways to other agents’ actions and environmental conditions. The results revealed that sexual reproduction is extremely relevant: in the proposed model cooperation was stronger between agents of opposite sex.
 OANA POPESCU Romanian Review of Regional Studies , 2008, Abstract: Between 2006 and 2008, the National Research and Development Institute for Urban and Regional Planning URBANPROIECT Bucharest participated - within the framework of EU programme INTERREG IIIB - at the DONAUREGIONEN Project: The Spatial Development Concept of Interregional Cooperation in the Danube Space. The aim of the project was to create a complex assemblage of knowledge about the potential possibilities of development in the Danube regions and the related interregional relations, to initiate common steps when choosing the regional development centres and to encourage cross-border cooperation. This action should help to overcome the existing information barriers and also the local authorities in the stage of planning the regional and city development. The project was structured by a summary evaluation of the development potential on the Danube area – analyses of problems, interests, and conflicts. The elaboration of the summary documents was based on the general answers to the four thematic fields representing the basic functional complex:1. Natural resources, environmental protection, and creation;2. Human resources, urban structure, and quality of life;3. Transport and technical infrastructure;4. Economic structure.On the basis of this summary evaluation, a concept of development and arrangement of the territory of the Danube area and a typology of regions will be developed and, finally, proposals and recommendations will be elaborated for regional and local authorities dealing with the regional and city development planning. The result of the project will be mainly to outline: - the conditions for the optimization of technical, territorial, socio-economic, and environmental relations in the Danube river corridor; - the existence of mutually linked and balanced urban and economic development centres, which will have positive influence on the development of their regions, and - the conditions for the constitution of a development corridor that will act as a stabilization agent balancing the regional disparities in the different member countries.The Geographical information system supporting the elaboration of the Donauregionen project system was conceived as a working GIS storing all the geographical data necessary for the processing of project outputs. All the geographical data were distributed in the WGS-84 system of coordinates. The project area of interest includes a territory within 5 countries of the Danube region (Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania).
 PLOS ONE , 2014, DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0090288 Abstract: We study the evolution of cooperation in a structured population, combining insights from evolutionary game theory and the study of interaction networks. In earlier studies it has been shown that cooperation is difficult to achieve in homogeneous networks, but that cooperation can get established relatively easily when individuals differ largely concerning the number of their interaction partners, such as in scale-free networks. Most of these studies do, however, assume that individuals change their behaviour in response to information they receive on the payoffs of their interaction partners. In real-world situations, subjects do not only learn from their interaction partners, but also from other individuals (e.g. teachers, parents, or friends). Here we investigate the implications of such incongruences between the ‘interaction network’ and the ‘learning network’ for the evolution of cooperation in two paradigm examples, the Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG) and the Snowdrift game (SDG). Individual-based simulations and an analysis based on pair approximation both reveal that cooperation will be severely inhibited if the learning network is very different from the interaction network. If the two networks overlap, however, cooperation can get established even in case of considerable incongruence between the networks. The simulations confirm that cooperation gets established much more easily if the interaction network is scale-free rather than random-regular. The structure of the learning network has a similar but much weaker effect. Overall we conclude that the distinction between interaction and learning networks deserves more attention since incongruences between these networks can strongly affect both the course and outcome of the evolution of cooperation.
 Quantitative Biology , 2014, Abstract: Sperm cooperation has evolved in a variety of taxa and is often considered a response to sperm competition, yet the benefit of this form of collective movement remains unclear. Here we use fine-scale imaging and a minimal mathematical model to study sperm aggregation in the rodent genus $Peromyscus$. We demonstrate that as the number of sperm cells in an aggregate increase, the group moves with more persistent linearity but without increasing speed; this benefit, however, is offset in larger aggregates as the geometry of the group forces sperm to swim against one another. The result is a non-monotonic relationship between aggregate size and average velocity with both a theoretically predicted and empirically observed optimum of 6-7 sperm/aggregate. To understand the role of sexual selection in driving these sperm group dynamics, we compared two sister-species with divergent mating systems and find that sperm of $P.\,maniculatus$ (highly promiscuous), which have evolved under intense competition, form optimal-sized aggregates more often than sperm of $P.\,polionotus$ (strictly monogamous), which lack competition. Our combined mathematical and experimental study of coordinated sperm movement reveals the importance of geometry, motion and group size on sperm velocity and suggests how these physical variables interact with evolutionary selective pressures to regulate cooperation in competitive environments.
 Globalization and Health , 2013, DOI: 10.1186/1744-8603-9-2 Abstract: Debate: We first consider Brazil's health technical cooperation within the country's wider cooperation programme, aiming to identify its key characteristics, claimed principles and values, and analysing how these translate into concrete projects in Portuguese-speaking African countries. Then we discuss the extent to which the Busan conference has changed the way development cooperation is conceptualised, and how Brazil's technical cooperation health projects fit within the new framework.We conclude that, by adopting new concepts on health cooperation and challenging established paradigms - in particular on health systems and HIV/AIDS fight - the Brazilian health experience has already contributed to shape the emerging consensus on development effectiveness. However, its impact on the field is still largely unscrutinised, and its projects seem to only selectively comply with some of the shared principles agreed upon in Busan. Although Brazilian cooperation is still a model in the making, not immune from contradictions and shortcomings, it should be seen as enriching the debate on development principles, thus offering alternative solutions to advance the discourse on cooperation effectiveness in health.
 Amparo Urbano SERIEs , 2011, DOI: 10.1007/s13209-011-0066-3 Abstract: This lecture provides a modeling of “group connectivity” by proposing a generalization of the concept of a graph. This new approach not only captures binary relations between agents but also high-order relations among subsets of them. The model allows us to characterize the minimal structures of cooperation survival in a spatial Prisoners’ Dilemma game in a Moore neighborhood and helps explain the existence of persistent “islands of cooperation” in hostile environments. The dynamic behavior shows an increase in the fraction of cooperators relative to the standard spatial Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
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