oalib
Search Results: 1 - 10 of 100 matches for " "
All listed articles are free for downloading (OA Articles)
Page 1 /100
Display every page Item
Management compensation incentive and restraint mechanism on the equity open-end funds
股票型开放式基金管理报酬激励约束机制

YIN Jie,CHEN Shou,ZOU Zi-ran,
尹洁
,陈收,邹自然

系统工程理论与实践 , 2011,
Abstract: To analyze the fund management compensation incentive and restraint mechanism,it empirically examed the relationship between the equity open-end fund management compensation and performance based on the static panel data model.The results show that fund management compensation incentive and restraint mechanism in China is not working effectively.So it made some improvements to existing contract using the principal-agent theory.It introduced excess return which reflects managers' effort level to measure fund...
Research on Top Management Incentive and Supervision under the Framework of Principal-Agent Based on Social Trust  [PDF]
Liushan Luo
Modern Economy (ME) , 2018, DOI: 10.4236/me.2018.911121
Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of social trust, an extremely important informal institution, on corporate governance. We use the data of 2008-2016 China’s A share listed private companies, to study how the regional social trust environment affect the efficiency of salary incentive mechanism on CEOs. We find that social trust can significantly improve the effect of executive compensation incentive, namely the compensation of the senior executive is more sensitive to performance in a firm with higher social trust. In particular, social trust can be an effective alternative to formal institution and plays an important role in corporate governance when the formal institution faced by the company is undeveloped.
高管声誉激励契约的强度、效用及作用途径——一个中国情境下的实证检验
Intensity,Effectiveness and Mechanism of Executive Reputation Incentive Contract:An Empirical Study in the Chinese Context
 [PDF]

王帅,徐宁,姜楠楠
- , 2016,
Abstract: 通过对部分高管进行访谈,并运用中国上市公司2007~2013年的平衡面板数据进行实证检验,结果表明:高管声誉激励强度与公司规模显著正相关,高管人力资本在两者之间具有中介作用;声誉激励通过与显性激励的交互效应从而对公司绩效产生间接的效用,具体而言,声誉激励与薪酬激励之间存在互补效应,与股权激励之间存在互替效应;产权性质能够对高管声誉激励效用产生显著的影响。
we do a study on the intensity, effectiveness and mechanism of the executive reputation incentive contract in the Chinese Context by an integrated method of quantitative and qualitative research. First we choose some executives to do an in-depth interview, and then do the empirical study using the panel data of listed companies during 2007~2013 in China. The results show: the corporate size has a positive effect on executives' reputation with executives' human capital value as a mediator; the reputation incentive contract has an indirect effect on corporate performance, more specifically, there is a complementary effect between reputation incentive and compensation incentive, and there is a substitution effect between reputation incentive and equity incentive; ownership nature has an obvious effect on the effectiveness of the executive reputation incentive contract.
Board Control, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance
董事会控制、经理报酬与公司经营绩效

LI Ya-jing,ZHU Hong-quan,HUANG Deng-shi,ZHOU Ying-feng,
李亚静

系统工程理论与实践 , 2005,
Abstract: This paper examines the role of board control, chief executive officer characteristics and firm performance in determining management compensation. Based on China stock market data in year 2001, the empirical results show that no significant relation exists between management compensation and board size, the proportion of independent directors on a board. The duality of CEO has significantly positive relation with the management compensation. In addition, the management compensation is much closely related to chief executive officer characteristics than to the board structure and firm performance.
Incentive Contract in Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information  [PDF]
Yingsheng Su,Hongmei Guo,Xianyu Wang
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society , 2014, DOI: 10.1155/2014/380142
Abstract: The supply chain always appears inefficient because of the different targets of members and information asymmetry, especially when upstream enterprises not only hide information about their effort levels, but also hide information about their technology level. The paper uses principal-agent theory and the theory of regulation to design the contract to realize the maximization of principal's profit on the condition that the contract satisfies the participant and incentive conditions of agent. As a result, it is obvious that the contract achieves the goal of control. In addition, it also can be concluded that the amount of rent that the manufacturer can obtain is up to the value of his information and the condition of his resource. 1. Introduction Supply chain is a network which can put suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and final users together, which is characterized by the integration of external resources for cooperation networks. Supply chain performance depends on the joint benefit of the enterprises [1]. However, the supply chain always appears inefficient because of the different targets of members and information asymmetry. Therefore, an important issue in supply chain management is how to establish the appropriate coordination mechanism for the independent enterprises in order to achieve the maximization of the overall profit of the supply chain [2–8]. Because of information asymmetry, the difficulty of coordination increases [9]. Many contracts and pieces of literature have studied the coordination of supply chain from perspective of principal-agent problem, while, at the same time, various aspects of coordination in supply chain have been studied too, such as pieces of literature [10–16]. In practice, the effort level of retailers can affect products’ demand. Literature [17] puts the effort level and risk preference of decision-making of node enterprise into decision-making model and analyses their impact on the decision and cooperation of supply chain. The literature [18] investigates the issue of channel coordination for a supply chain facing stochastic demand that is sensitive to both sales effort and retail price. In the literature [19], a perishable product’s supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer is considered; on the premise of retailer’s effort and return price dependent demand, the mathematical models of quantity flexibility contract are established. The literature [20] analyses retailer’s effort level’s impact on supply chain revenue-sharing evolvement- contract and gain retailer’s effort level’s
Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device. An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector
Axel Gautier,Anne Yvrande-Billon
Review of Economics and Institutions , 2013, DOI: 10.5202/rei.v4i1.88
Abstract: In the French urban public transport industry, operations are often delegated and periodicallyput out for tender. Thus, operators’ incentives to reduce costs come from both profitmaximization during the current contract and from the perspective of contract renewal. Weconstruct a dynamic incentive regulation model that captures these features and we show thatboth the level of cost-reducing effort and its repartition during the contracting period dependon the contract type (cost-plus, gross cost or net cost contract). We then estimate a costfrontier model for an eight-year panel of French bus companies (664 company-yearobservations) to test our predictions.
Incentive contract design of reverse supply chain on basis of overconfidence
基于过度自信的逆供应链激励机制设计*

BAO Xiao-ying,HU Ben-yong,TANG Xiao-wo,
包晓英
,胡本勇,唐小我

计算机应用研究 , 2011,
Abstract: Supposed the retailer was overconfident,this paper discussed incentive design on the basis of overconfidence. It analyzed the influences mechanism of overconfidence to incentive contract design including incentive coefficient, return effort level and agency cost with mathematical induction, and based the influences mechanism to design the optimum incentive contract. The results show the overconfidence advanced the valuable and has value on designing reverse supply chain incentive and improving incentive efficiency.
Endogenous Choice of Managerial Incentives in a Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Private Firm  [PDF]
Kadohognon Sylvain Ouattara
Theoretical Economics Letters (TEL) , 2016, DOI: 10.4236/tel.2016.62029
Abstract: This paper studies the endogenous choice of managerial incentives in a mixed duopoly where a public firm competes with a foreign private firm. The foreign firm is partly owned by domestic investors and the firm’s owners have the option to hire a manager. We focus on a new incentive scheme of public firm’s managers that is a linear combination of social welfare and sales revenue. In equilibrium we find that when the weight attached to the foreign firm’s profits in social welfare is high enough, only the public firm hires a manager. This is in contrast with the classical sales delegation contract used in existing literature.
Design on the Incentive Contract of University Achievements Commercialization Offices Based on Principal-Agent Theory  [PDF]
Meifang Li, Yongxiang Zhao, Feng Shi
Journal of Service Science and Management (JSSM) , 2010, DOI: 10.4236/jssm.2010.31009
Abstract: Based on principal-agent theory, an incentive contract model of university achievements commercialization offices (UACO) was constructed in this paper, and an optimal incentive contract between university and UACO was researched into. The conclusion indicates that many factors, such as working ability, working willingness, risk aversion degree of UACO, as well as the outside uncertain factors and so on, have important influences on the contract design. The efficiency of commercialization of university inventions has a squared forward growth relation with working ability, a direct proportion with working willingness, and has an inverse proportion with risk aversion degree of UACO and with outside uncertainty. Additionally, the level of hard working of UACO under the condition of information asymmetry is strictly less than that of information symmetry.
Profit Incentive In A Secondary Spectrum Market: A Contract Design Approach  [PDF]
Shang-Pin Sheng,Mingyan Liu
Computer Science , 2012,
Abstract: In this paper we formulate a contract design problem where a primary license holder wishes to profit from its excess spectrum capacity by selling it to potential secondary users/buyers. It needs to determine how to optimally price the excess spectrum so as to maximize its profit, knowing that this excess capacity is stochastic in nature, does not come with exclusive access, and cannot provide deterministic service guarantees to a buyer. At the same time, buyers are of different {\em types}, characterized by different communication needs, tolerance for the channel uncertainty, and so on, all of which a buyer's private information. The license holder must then try to design different contracts catered to different types of buyers in order to maximize its profit. We address this problem by adopting as a reference a traditional spectrum market where the buyer can purchase exclusive access with fixed/deterministic guarantees. We fully characterize the optimal solution in the cases where there is a single buyer type, and when multiple types of buyers share the same, known channel condition as a result of the primary user activity. In the most general case we construct an algorithm that generates a set of contracts in a computationally efficient manner, and show that this set is optimal when the buyer types satisfy a monotonicity condition.
Page 1 /100
Display every page Item


Home
Copyright © 2008-2017 Open Access Library. All rights reserved.