As already mentioned, we make use of the Baseline and Gift treatment data that were presented in . This other paper included a communication treatment where among other things we studied decision maker's interpretation of the message as an alternative for a 3rd party interpretation. The decision forms thus included a non-salient question of why player As thought they were sent a message and what did the message mean to them. In order to be consistent across treatments an analogous question was asked in the Gift treatment analyzed in the current study. By including the non-salient questions asking about motivations behind subjects' behavior our procedures differ from the standard way the investment game is run. We have checked our data against data in  for any effects of including these questions and found no significant differences in subjects' behavior in the respective baseline treatments.
has been cited by the following article:
- TITLE: Building Trust—One Gift at a Time
- AUTHORS: Maro？ Servátka,Steven Tucker,Radovan Vadovi？
- KEYWORDS: experimental economics, gift giving, investment game, trust, trustworthiness
JOURNAL NAME: Games
Sep 07, 2014
- ABSTRACT: This paper reports an experiment evaluating the effect of gift giving on building trust. We have nested our explorations in the standard version of the investment game. Our gift treatment includes a dictator stage in which the trustee decides whether to give a gift to the trustor before both of them proceed to play the investment game. We observe that in such case the majority of trustees offer their endowment to trustors. Consequently, receiving a gift significantly increases the amounts sent by trustors when controlling for the differences in payoffs created by it. Trustees are, however, not better off by giving a gift as the increase in the amount sent by trustors is not large enough to offset the trustees’ loss associated with the cost of giving a gift.