Article citations

    An alternative design would be to include a “mandatory gift” treatment where both players begin with $10, but the experimenter imposes a “gift” of $10 on the trustee. While this alternative addresses the possibility of player A′s internalizing the $20 endowments, it is also likely to introduce experimenter demand effects and possibly even create confusion among subjects. One of the referees pointed out another control that also removes the intentions in the initial gift decision. In particular, one could implement a random device that determines whether player B′s endowment is transferred to player A.

has been cited by the following article:

  • TITLE: Building Trust—One Gift at a Time
  • AUTHORS: Maro? Servátka,Steven Tucker,Radovan Vadovi?
  • KEYWORDS: experimental economics, gift giving, investment game, trust, trustworthiness
  • JOURNAL NAME: Games DOI: 10.3390/g2040412 Sep 07, 2014
  • ABSTRACT: This paper reports an experiment evaluating the effect of gift giving on building trust. We have nested our explorations in the standard version of the investment game. Our gift treatment includes a dictator stage in which the trustee decides whether to give a gift to the trustor before both of them proceed to play the investment game. We observe that in such case the majority of trustees offer their endowment to trustors. Consequently, receiving a gift significantly increases the amounts sent by trustors when controlling for the differences in payoffs created by it. Trustees are, however, not better off by giving a gift as the increase in the amount sent by trustors is not large enough to offset the trustees’ loss associated with the cost of giving a gift.