In the existing literature, the behavior of player A and player B in an investment game is often interpreted as proxies for trusting and trustworthy behavior [17,32]. There are other possible motivations why players would send and return positive amounts, such as distributive other-regarding preferences [80–82], preferences for increasing social welfare , reciprocity [25,84–87] or various psychological motivations, such as guilt aversion [88,89]. One could, of course, also ask the follow up question: How does a gift affect other-regarding preferences?  presents an experiment that separates trust and reciprocity from other-regarding preferences in the investment game. Similarly, it is possible to design an experiment that would identify the effect of gift separately on trust and other-regarding preferences. In this paper we are primarily concerned with the size of the investment and efficiency as the measure of trust.
has been cited by the following article:
- TITLE: Building Trust—One Gift at a Time
- AUTHORS: Maro？ Servátka,Steven Tucker,Radovan Vadovi？
- KEYWORDS: experimental economics, gift giving, investment game, trust, trustworthiness
JOURNAL NAME: Games
Sep 07, 2014
- ABSTRACT: This paper reports an experiment evaluating the effect of gift giving on building trust. We have nested our explorations in the standard version of the investment game. Our gift treatment includes a dictator stage in which the trustee decides whether to give a gift to the trustor before both of them proceed to play the investment game. We observe that in such case the majority of trustees offer their endowment to trustors. Consequently, receiving a gift significantly increases the amounts sent by trustors when controlling for the differences in payoffs created by it. Trustees are, however, not better off by giving a gift as the increase in the amount sent by trustors is not large enough to offset the trustees’ loss associated with the cost of giving a gift.