All Title Author
Keywords Abstract


BVS: A Lightweight Forward and Backward Secure Scheme for PMU Communications in Smart Grid

DOI: 10.1155/2011/382147

Full-Text   Cite this paper   Add to My Lib

Abstract:

In smart grid, phaser measurement units (PMUs) can upload readings to utility centers via supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) or energy management system (EMS) to enable intelligent controlling and scheduling. It is critical to maintain the secrecy of readings so as to protect customers' privacy, together with integrity and source authentication for the reliability and stability of power scheduling. In particular, appealing security scheme needs to perform well in PMUs that usually have computational resource constraints, thus designed security protocols have to remain lightweight in terms of computation and storage. In this paper, we propose a family of schemes to solve this problem. They are public key based scheme (PKS), password based scheme (PWS) and billed value-based scheme (BVS). BVS can achieve forward and backward security and only relies on hash functions. Security analysis justifies that the proposed schemes, especially BVS, can attain the security goals with low computation and storage cost. 1. Introduction Smart grid is envisioned as a long-term strategy for national energy independence, controlling emission, and combating global warming [1]. Smart grid technologies utilize intelligent transmission to deliver electricity, together with distribution networks to enable two-way communications. These approaches aim to improve reliability and efficiency of the electric system via gathering consumption data, delivering dynamic optimization of operations, and arranging energy saving schedules. The smart grid promises to transform traditional centralized, producer-controlled network to a decentralized, consumer-interactive network. For example, consumers react to pricing signals delivered by control unit from smart meters to achieve active load adjustment. Supervisory control And data acquisition (SCADA) or energy management system (EMS) may collect one data points every 1 to 2?seconds, whereas phaser measurement units (PMUs) may collect 30 to 60?data points per second [2]. The security of smart grid is a critical issue for its applicability, development and deployment [3–7]. On one hand, the security, and especially the availability of power supplying system, affects homeland security, as it is an indispensable infrastructure for pubic living system [8–10]. That is, any transient interruption will result in economic and social disaster. On the other hand, introduction of end devices such as PMUs requests for data and communication security to support secure and reliable uploading of measurements [11, 12]. As the PMUs are exposed far

References

[1]  P. McDaniel and S. McLaughlin, “Security and privacy challenges in the smart grid,” IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 75–77, 2009.
[2]  H. Khurana, M. Hadley, N. Lu, et al., “Smart-grid security issues,” IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 81–85, 2010.
[3]  F. Boroomand, A. Fereidunian, M. A. Zamani, et al., “Cyber security for smart grid: a human-automation interaction framework,” in Proceedings of the IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe (ISGT Europe '10), pp. 1–6, November 2010.
[4]  S. Clements and H. Kirkham, “Cyber-security considerations for the smart grid,” in Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting (PES '10), pp. 1–5, September 2010.
[5]  A. R. Metke and R. L. Ekl, “Security technology for smart grid networks,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 99–107, 2010.
[6]  D. Wei, Y. Lu, M. Jafari, et al., “An integrated security system of protecting smart grid against cyber attacks,” in Proceedings of the Innovative Smart Grid Technologies (ISGT '10), pp. 1–7, 2010.
[7]  M. Amin, “Challenges in reliability, security, efficiency, and resilience of energy infrastructure: toward smart self-healing electric power grid,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting (PES '08), pp. 1–5, Pittsburgh, Pa, USA, July 2008.
[8]  G. N. Ericsson, “Cyber security and power system communication—essential parts of a smart grid infrastructure,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 1501–1507, 2010.
[9]  J. T. Seo and C. Lee, “The green defenders,” IEEE Power and Energy Magazine, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 82–90, 2011.
[10]  J. Kim and J. Lee, “A model of stability,” IEEE Power and Energy Magazine, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 75–81, 2011.
[11]  K. M. Rogers, R. Klump, H. Khurana, A. A. Aquino-Lugo, and T. J. Overbye, “An authenticated control framework for distributed voltage support on the smart grid,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 40–47, 2010.
[12]  Y. Wang, I. R. Pordanjani, and W. Xu., “An event-driven demand response scheme for power system security enhancement,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 23–29, 2011.
[13]  K. Moslehi and R. Kumar, “A reliability perspective of the smart grid,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 57–64, 2010.
[14]  Y. Wang, W. Li, and J. Lu, “Reliability analysis of wide-area measurement system,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 1483–1491, 2010.
[15]  J. Ma, P. Zhang, H. j. Fu, et al., “Application of phasor measurement unit on locating disturbance source for low-frequency oscillation,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 340–346, 2010.
[16]  K. Budka, J. Deshpande, J. Hobby, et al., “Geri—bell labs smart grid research focus: economic modeling, networking, and security amp; privacy,” in Proceedings of the 1st IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm '10), pp. 208–213, November 2010.
[17]  A. Vaccaro, M. Popov, D. Villacci, and V. Terzija, “An integrated framework for smart microgrids modeling, monitoring, control, communication, and verification,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 99, no. 1, pp. 119–132, 2011.
[18]  T. Zhang, W. Lin, Y. Wang, et al., “The design of information security protection framework to support smart grid,” in Proceedings of the 2010 International Conference on Power System Technology (POWERCON '10), pp. 1–5, 2010.
[19]  T. M. Overman and R.W. Sackman, “High assurance smart grid: smart grid control systems communications architecture,” in Proceedings of the 1st IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm '10), pp. 19–24, November 2010.
[20]  T. L. Lim and Y. Li, “A security and performance evaluation of hash-based rfid protocols,” in Proceedings of the 5th China International Conferences on Information Security and Cryptology (Inscrypt '09), vol. 5487 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 406–424, 2009.
[21]  A. L. Selvakumar and C. S. Ganadhas, “The evaluation report of sha-256 crypt analysis hash function,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Communication Software and Networks (ICCSN '09), pp. 588–592, June 2009.
[22]  B. Baldwin, A. Byrne, M. Hamilton et al., “FPGA implementations of SHA-3 candidates: cubehash, grostl, lane, shabal and spectral hash,” in Proceedings of the 12th Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design: Architectures, Methods and Tools, (DSD '09), pp. 783–790, Patras, Greece, August 2009.
[23]  N. Sklavos and P. Kitsos, “Blake hash function family on fpga: from the fastest to the smallest,” in Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI '10), pp. 139–142, September 2010.

Full-Text

comments powered by Disqus

Contact Us

service@oalib.com

QQ:3279437679

微信:OALib Journal