All Title Author
Keywords Abstract

-  2016 

风险规避下基于Stackelberg博弈与Nash讨价还价博弈的供应链契约比较
Comparison of Supply Chain Contracts Based on Stackelberg Game and Nash bargaining Model with the Assumption of Risk Aversion

Keywords: 批发价契约, 回购契约, 风险规避, Stackelberg博弈, Nash讨价还价博弈,
wholesale price contract
, buyback contract, risk aversion, Stackelberg game, Nash bargaining model

Full-Text   Cite this paper   Add to My Lib

Abstract:

摘要 以批发价契约与回购契约为例,分析与比较风险规避型供应链分别采取Stackelberg博弈和Nash讨价还价博弈时的最优化决策,探讨供应链主导方如何根据合作伙伴的风险规避水平选择契约与博弈机制。研究表明,当零售商与供应商风险规避水平相同时,供应链的最优选择是采用Nash讨价还价博弈的批发价契约或者回购契约,二者等价;当零售商与供应商风险规避水平比较接近时,采用Nash讨价还价博弈下的回购契约要优于相同博弈机制下的批发价契约;当零售商与供应商风险规避水平相差较大时,供应商不会选择Nash讨价还价博弈下的任一契约,而是选择Stackelberg博弈下的回购契约。与风险中性假设下的结论相比,风险规避下的研究结论更符合供应链管理实践

Full-Text

comments powered by Disqus

Contact Us

service@oalib.com

QQ:3279437679

微信:OALib Journal