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分利型村治中的贿选与村级权力正当性――基于L村选举史的讨论

Keywords: 贿选, 分利型村治, 土地派系, 村级权力正当性, 乡村治理

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Abstract:

文章通过一个村庄的选举史叙述,解析了竞争性选举和土地派系、分利型村治形成的复杂关系,并在村庄治理背景下展现了贿选的成因和多重治理功能,从而形成对竞争性选举制度与村庄权力正当性的多维度理解。研究表明:土地派系存在和形成于村级治理过程之中,构成村庄分利秩序的基础性结构;分利型村治在竞争性选举中强化并逐步和选举互相依赖,但选举本身并未能提高村级权力的正当性;贿选强化分利型村治,增强了其公平性,一定程度上提高了村级权力正当性;竞争性选举与村级权力正当性之间的关系复杂。文章意在挑战民主选举提升村庄权力正当性的既有理解,并借以重新开启村级权力产生途径的探讨。
Based on the history of village election, the present paper analyzed the complicated relationship involving competitive election and farm-land factions and interest-share-type village governance, and elaborated on the causes of bribery election and multi-administration function in the background of village governance, so that the multi-dimensional understanding of competitive election and village power legitimacy is formed. The study showed that the rise of farm-land factions and their existence in the process of village governance gave rise to the basic structure of village-interest-share order. Interest-share-type village governance was enhanced and gradually formed a mutual inter-dependent relationship with elections in the competitive election, but the election itself never upgraded the legitimacy of village powers. Bribery-election strengthened the interest-share-type village governance, promoted its fairness and raised the village power legitimacy to a higher level to some extent. Hence, the relationship between competitive election and village power legitimacy is complicated. The present paper aimed at challenging the existing conception on democratic election’s promotion of village power legitimacy, and thereby resurrecting the discussion on village power generation paths

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