This article proposes a model of endogenous protection by integrating
informed and non-informed voters in the population. The model also
distinguishes between interest groups and pressure groups, by considering that
the members of one interest group do not necessarily organize as a pressure
group (lobby). The endogenous tariff stemming from the model is an increasing
function of the relative influence of the lobby, and the aforementioned
function itself increases in accordance with the part of non-informed voters.
This framework avoids formalizing contributions. It also permits to show that
the conditions of the lobbying’s efficiency depend on the nature of the free
rider comportment of the interest group members.
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Desai, R.M. and Olofsgard, A. (2011) The Costs of Political Influence: Firm-Level Evidence From Developing Countries. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 6, 137-178. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00010094
Yasar, M., Rejesus, R.M., Chen, Y. and Chakravorty, U. (2011) Political Influence of Firms in the Tradables and Non-Tradables Sectors: A Cross-Country Analysis. Economics & Politics, 23, 297-312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00386.x
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