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On Revised QA-VCG Mechanism in Procurement Combinatorial Auction
采购组合拍卖改进机制研究

Keywords: procurement auction,combinatorial auction,mechanism design
采购拍卖
,组合拍卖,机制设计

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Abstract:

We propose QA-VCG,an efficient multi-attributes procurement combinatorial auction,in which suppliers will bid combinations of items with truthful report.Moreover,we design a revised mechanism,revised QA-VCG,which enhances the auctioneer's revenue with all desired properties in QA-VCG.Furthermore,in terms of enhancing auctioneer's expected revenue,we prove revised QA-VCG is optimal mechanism.

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